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This is a guide to writing for professional philosophers – in particular, a guide to writing articles 
in contemporary philosophy. I plead ignorance of writing books and of writing as a historian of 
philosophy, though I hope that some of my suggestions will generalize to these cases. While the 
guide is pitched primarily for graduate students, perhaps it will be of some value to philosophy 
professors as well. I provide it because little information on this topic is widely available, because 
many philosophy graduate programs, even excellent ones, do not systematically address this 
topic, and because excellence in general writing is woefully insufficient for excellence in 
professional philosophical writing.2 
 It is often thought that excellent philosophical writing is the sole province of the genius. 
I by contrast believe that writing is a skill and can therefore be taught and learned; in any case, 
if there is some special talent for writing then I do not have it. When, near the end of my graduate 
career, I first began submitting my work to journals, I received 18 consecutive rejections distributed 
across 5 different manuscripts, with not even an invitation to revise-and-resubmit to cushion the 
blows. At last, on the 19th try, I secured my first publication in Philosophical Studies. Even that 
paper was merely a reply, and not a particularly ambitious one. I then undertook a disciplined 
program to improve my writing, as described in §5, and over the next several years my work 
climbed steadily in quality. I have now published 8 articles in venues including Journal of 
Philosophy, Philosophers’ Imprint, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. I make no claim to 
be a great philosophical writer: I do not take my résumé to be especially impressive, and a résumé 
rarely tells much anyway given the vagaries of the review process. I claim only that I have come 
far in my writing, that I can articulate precisely how I have done so, and, most importantly, that 
my methods are highly replicable. 
I begin by discussing the central prerequisites of excellent writing: reading and thinking 
(§1, §2). The core of the guide is dedicated to the content and form of excellent writing (§3), 
though I also briefly discuss the process of writing (§4) and the two major poles of publication 
strategies (§5). I end with comments on how to cultivate oneself as a philosopher (§6). 
I welcome questions, suggestions, and criticisms. (Praise would be not just welcome but 
surprising.) Please feel free to contact me at neil.jag.mehta@gmail.com. 
                                                 
1 Version 1.1; last revised September 23, 2016. Updated versions will be posted periodically at 
www.profneilmehta.com. 
2 For further advice, see Brooks (ms) and Lin (ms). 
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1. Reading and thinking: process 
 
Students sometimes think that they must first read extensively before they may begin forming 
their own views. Not so: proper reading is continuous with original thinking. 
 Hence, from the very first article that I encounter in a new area, I begin the critical work of 
gathering evidence, which I treat as candidate explananda; identifying hypotheses, which I treat 
as candidate explanantia; uncovering assumptions; and sketching out my own tentative ideas and 
arguments. I also attempt to identify the central questions and influential answers, which I then 
try to subsume into a taxonomy of all possible views, as per the discussion of systematicity in §3. 
I have no fear of trying my hand at these ambitious tasks from the start because even failure is 
handsomely rewarded. For I constantly revise my understanding as I read new work, and without 
a tentative understanding I would have nothing to revise. 
 I approach any new area with a set of general categories under which I can fruitfully 
subsume questions, theses, argumentative strategies, etc. For example, I often begin by trying to 
identify the central metaphysical, epistemic, and semantic questions in an area, as well as the 
connections among possible answers to those questions. I also try to classify views in terms of 
what explanatory relations, such as relations of explanatory priority, they posit.3 Relatedly, I 
find it useful to consider what a theory takes as metaphysically or conceptually fundamental and 
non-fundamental. 
 Regarding the foundations of normativity, for example, consider the relationship between 
facts about reasons and facts about rationality. One of the following views must be true: either 
the former always explain the latter, or the latter always explain the former, or there is no 
uniform explanatory relation between the facts of these two types. When I encounter a new view 
about the relationship between reasons and rationality, I locate it in this taxonomy – a taxonomy 
that appears in the literature, but that I independently developed as an aid to my thinking. 
Similarly, I consider which normative entities, if any, are treated as fundamental by which 
theories. The anti-reductivist holds roughly that some normative entity is metaphysically 
fundamental, and anti-reductivists have variously identified goodness, rightness, reasons, 
obligation, or virtue as fundamental. Though reductivists hold in contrast that no normative 
entity is fundamental, it is still useful to consider which normative entities they take as relatively 
fundamental, i.e., more fundamental than any other normative entity. 
 While reading, I rely on certain heuristics to generate hypotheses worth exploring. My 
most general heuristic is replacement: replacing a salient term in some philosophical thesis with 
a related term. Three further heuristics, though they usually stand under the umbrella of the 
replacement heuristic, are noteworthy in their own right: extension – applying a similar thesis 
to a nearby topic; generalization – applying a broader thesis to a topic that includes the topic of 
the original thesis as a special case; and unification – identifying a single thesis that entails 
several existing theses. 
 Take the thesis that an assertion that p is epistemically permissible just in case one knows 
that p. I might consider several extensions of this thesis: e.g., that a belief that p, or a treatment of 
the proposition that p as a reason for action, is epistemically permissible just in case one knows that 
p. I might also try extending that last thesis: perhaps a treatment of the proposition that p as a 
reason for belief is epistemically permissible just in case one knows that p. I might then attempt 
to unify the last two theses: perhaps a treatment of the proposition that p as a reason, full stop, is 
epistemically permissible just in case one knows that p. All the while, I might consider various 
options for replacement. Perhaps the relevant normative notion is not epistemic permissibility, but 
                                                 
3 I suspect that David Chalmers uses a similar heuristic given the remarks in his (2011, pp. 538-539). 
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epistemic goodness, epistemic success, or epistemic virtuousness.4 Once I have generated a rich set of 
possible hypotheses, I go on to test their predictions against the evidence. 
 On to brass tacks about the reading process, then. I use a detailed system of notation 
whenever I read: I double-underline any technical term, I mark key examples with an asterisk, I 
underline any reasonably significant claim once, and I mark especially central claims with an 
arrow, using triple arrows to mark the major theses of the entire article or book chapter. On top 
of that, after completing each reading I summarize it, sometimes in great detail, in a separate 
Word document. Because of this documentation, I know that I have read more than 1000 articles 
and book chapters in the past 8 years, though I am aware of some very successful philosophers 
who read much less and others who read much more. I prefer to read fewer texts deeply than to 
read many texts shallowly. Hence my default is to read any article or book chapter twice, typically 
spending 45-60 minutes per reading, though if I find a text disappointing I read it only once.  
 Obviously, what is important is not to adopt this idiosyncratic system. You should just 
develop some method for engaging deeply with texts. As I see it, reading a philosophical text is 
less like pouring water into a bucket and more like wrestling an ill-tempered bear. I encourage 
anyone to read in a similar spirit. 
 
 
2. Reading: content 
 
What to read depends very much on your career stage. In the pre-dissertation stage of your 
graduate career, build from the foundations. Start with the classics of the 20th century before 
reading seminal works of the past few decades; then, if you are particularly interested in the topic, 
you might delve into contemporary articles. In philosophy of language, for example, I might start 
with Frege, Russell, Quine, and Kripke before moving on to work published in the last few 
decades. Prioritize learning to tell the forests apart; the names of the trees can wait.5  
 Change tack a year or so before you begin to write your dissertation. Specialize. Within 
your chosen area (metaphysics, political philosophy, aesthetics), find some narrow topic that is 
under discussion right now – ideally, a topic on which much has been published within the last 5 
years, but on which little was published 10-20 years ago – and read one or two dozen papers on 
it. Make sure that you have read every major paper on that topic, including every paper that 
appears in a top-quality journal and every paper written by a major figure in the field; also read 
many minor papers.6 Rinse. Repeat with another topic, which should still be within your area of 
specialization but which need not be obviously related to the first topic. Rinse and repeat one last 
time. By now you should be within 3-6 months of starting your dissertation, and you should have 
a clear idea for one article and a tentative thought about a second. At this stage, that is plenty. 
                                                 
4 It was by using these heuristics that I developed the ideas for my (2015). I also regard John Turri as a master of 
the replacement heuristic, e.g. in his (2010), and Schaffer has run the idea of contrastivity through the extension 
heuristic many times, e.g. in his (2005a), (2005b), and (2012). For a discussion of other heuristics, see Hájek (2014), 
who recommends among other things checking whether a definite description has a unique referent, examining 
extreme or near-extreme cases, and considering cases of self-reference. 
5 I would offer very different advice to Masters students intending to apply to Ph.D. programs, who should aim to 
publish much more quickly. Such students should instead follow the advice below on specialized reading and can 
return to building from the foundations after being admitted to a Ph.D. program. My advice is also intended 
primarily for students in North America, as students in the U.K. must specialize much earlier. 
6 For a poll that illuminates which generalist journals are most highly regarded, see 
http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2015/09/the-top-20-general-philosophy-journals-2015.html. For 
information about the most influential figures in the field, pay attention to citations, and ask experts – especially 
your dissertation adviser.  
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Once your dissertation is underway, you must of course continue to read in this narrow 
way most of the time. But you must reserve some time, perhaps a month or two each summer, for 
reading in new areas. Still read with focus – read a dozen papers on parsimony as a theoretical 
virtue or on Kant’s second Critique – but go far beyond the confines of your specialization.  
For this practice of broad reading I offer a pure and an impure rationale. Speaking purely, 
philosophy itself has a thoroughly holistic character and so cannot be expertly handled one 
narrow topic at a time. To do truly outstanding work on the nature of reasons, you must 
understand philosophy of language, so that you can analyze reasons-talk, metaphysics, so that 
you can discuss the ontic status of reasons, and ethics and epistemology, so that you can identify 
and explain facts about practical and epistemic reasons. 
Speaking impurely, if you read only what everyone else in your field is reading then you 
will find it very hard to think something that no one else in your field is thinking. In the four 
years dating from the start of my dissertation, I was scooped no less than 3 times. Once I found 
a major idea of mine already published in a paper that I had overlooked, and twice more I was 
beaten to the presses by a forthcoming paper. To be clear: these were not instances of plagiarism. 
They were instances of independent convergence on a natural idea. But after learning this lesson 
I have rarely been scooped, and I credit the change to my unusual pattern of familiarity with the 
literature. Because by now I have read deeply on perception, phenomenal character, metaphysical 
grounding, knowledge-first epistemology, and internalism about practical reasons, my ideas are 
very unlikely to occur to others – not because I am cleverer or even better-read, but just because 
I am differently read. 
So drill in far-flung places, but drill each hole deep. 
 
 
3. Writing: content and form 
 
In this section, which is the heart of this guide, I list those virtues pertaining to content and form 
that I regard as most central. Along with a description of these virtues, I include many references 
to exemplary works, and though my emphasis is on contemporary articles, I could not resist 
including a few books and historical works. I encourage the reader to study these works as a 
general might study the battles of Napoleon and Alexander: virtue is best learned from models.  
The list will be very controversial, for it is the product of a very controversial conception 
of philosophical excellence.7 I urge those with a different conception of philosophical excellence 
– that will be most readers, I imagine – to articulate their own conceptions and to identify their 
own models. I mean this seriously. Such an exercise forces a level of reflection, and a degree of 
explicitness, that will be a great help to any writer. 
I start with those virtues that I take to be most worthy of deliberate cultivation – which 
are not quite the same as those virtues that most contribute to philosophical excellence – and I 
descend from there. 
 
  
                                                 
7 It was Tamar Gendler who shared with me the basic outlines of this conception. I remember one conversation in 
particular: it occurred in Clare’s Corner Copia on May 17, 2013 and amounted to the best instruction I have ever 
had in the art of philosophical writing. Below Tamar will find much of the advice she gave me then – especially in 
my descriptions of systematicity, significance, mastery of the literature, and authority – and in keeping with that 
last virtue I say that the conception articulated here is ultimately my own. 
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Ambition. This, above all. Consider what it would take for a text to meet the highest 
standards of philosophical excellence. It would have to be profoundly significant, original, 
systematic, economical, precise, lucid, accessible, rigorously argued, and more. Measured against 
this ideal, the works of Plato and Nāgārjuna, Hume and Kant are – not bad. You should aim to 
do better.8 
 This advice will strike many as arrogant and foolish. It is neither. It would be arrogant 
to expect to reach or even approach the ideal. But to strive for it is noble and will in time vastly 
improve your writing. To appreciate that you will always fall desperately short and to accept the 
fact with good cheer is modesty enough. 
 
 Authority. Regard yourself as a master of the topic. Do not rely uncritically on the 
distinctions and definitions provided by other philosophers. Instead make all distinctions in the 
way you regard as most perspicuous, and define all terms in the way that you regard as most 
precise.9 Do not describe the motivations for various positions as they are described by influential 
figures. Instead describe them in the most apt way. Do not even rest content with rebutting the 
arguments of your opponents. State the best version of each argument, the version that your 
opponents should have given, and rebut that.10 Nor should you waste time in the body of the paper 
demonstrating that your approach is better than those in the literature. Just make your approach 
better, perhaps briefly discussing the shortcomings of extant approaches in footnotes. In short, 
draw the definitive map of the philosophical terrain. 
So as to maintain focus on the ideas, do not even cite any contemporary philosophers in the body 
of the paper.11 (That is, absent compelling reasons to do otherwise, as when you are writing a reply 
article.) Relegate all citations to the footnotes. Those footnotes should, however, be extensive; 
they should meticulously document the relationships between your philosophical map and the 
philosophical maps of others. See the discussion below of mastery of the literature. 
 While you are at it, prune needlessly modest language, including phrases like “in my 
view,” “I believe that,” and “it seems that.” Write with confidence.12 
 
 Systematicity. To be systematic is to minimize arbitrariness. Thus, when laying out 
possible views on some topic, do not just list the currently influential views in the literature. 
Instead develop an illuminating taxonomy – a categorization of possibilities that are mutually 
exclusive and jointly exhaustive given your assumptions, with all divisions between these 
possibilities marking profound differences – and situate all currently influential views within it.13 
When stating a problem, do not merely list some claims that are hard to reconcile. Instead 
identify n claims such that each is very plausible, any n-1 of them are consistent, but all n together 
                                                 
8 Fine (1994); Williamson (2000); Chalmers and Jackson (2001); Schaffer (2009) and (2016); Skorupski (2010); 
Greco (2012); Berker (2013); and Lormand (ms). These works perhaps fall short of the great works of history and 
certainly fall short of the ideal. But at least they try. 
9 Lormand (1996, introduction and §1) and (ms, introduction and §1); Schellenberg (2010); Berker (2013, pp. 337-
338 and 344-348); Millar (2015). 
10 Lewis (1984). 
11 Why the distinction between contemporary and historical philosophers? Not because you should defer to Plato 
or Kant – see the discussion of ambition – but because referring to them helps locate your view against others at 
the highest level of generality and has all the literary value of allusion to boot. See Street (2010); Millar (2015). 
12 Williamson (2000); Chalmers and Jackson (2001); Street (2010, pp. 369-370). 
13 Street (2006, §2) and (2010, pp. 369-370). Aristotle and Kant are also wonderfully systematic writers who use 




are inconsistent.14 When addressing objections, do not merely list various objections or opposing 
views that occur to you. Instead divide objections or opposing views into a taxonomy of salient 
clusters and address each salient cluster of objections.15 When attacking a view, do not merely 
provide the telling counterexample. Also identify the relevant class of counterexamples, diagnose 
the problematic feature of the opposing view that leaves it open to counterexamples of this class, 
and show that your view lacks this problematic feature.16 Even when just transitioning between 
paragraphs or sections, make it implicitly clear why the new topic is next on the agenda. 
 
Rigor. Support your thesis with conclusive evidence. You may use a single decisive 
argument17 or an array of considerations that are together overwhelming.18  
Limit yourself to dialectically effective evidence – evidence that even your opponent 
should accept.19 Therefore, avoid relying on all but the most robust intuitions.20 Focus instead 
on theoretical considerations (simplicity, explanatory power, fruitfulness, etc.), scientific data, 
linguistic facts, and the most universally acknowledged truths,21 or just show that your theory is 
strictly better than your opponent’s theory.22 
Do not rest content with presenting a prima facie objection to a view. Instead, press your 
point as far as possible: consider all possible categories of response (see the above discussion of 
systematicity) and show that they all fail. Also point out fallback positions – e.g., show that an 
opponent who rejects a crucial premise of your argument may still accept some weaker premise 
which supports a weaker but still interesting version of your conclusion.23 And if there are 
multiple independent or partly independent routes to your conclusion, say so.  
Suppose, as will often be the case, that you wish to rely on claims that you cannot 
rigorously support. Then jettison any arguments for those claims and introduce them as assumptions.24 
Do not hesitate to make controversial assumptions as long as you identify them as such. State all 
assumptions in your introduction, however, as your reader will feel cheated if you help yourself 
to controversial claims once the argument is underway. You may motivate your assumptions if 
you wish, but be brief lest it seem that you are trying to argue for them. 
 
Significance. Emphasize what matters. Minimize everything else. 
Start by articulating, in the most general terms, the central philosophical problem(s) that 
you will address and the central solution(s) that you will propose. Highlight these. Use the 
positions of famous historical philosophers as landmarks to orient your reader, give telling 
metaphors, be generous with examples, and even restate the same point in equivalent ways if this 
is helpful. Heed this advice especially in beginnings and endings, whether of your entire article 
or of individual sections. Likewise, though on a smaller scale, when you get into a welter of 
details. Just keep pausing to explain, as broadly as possible, what you have done and why it is 
                                                 
14 Egan and John (ms, p. 1). 
15 Millar (2015). 
16 Gendler (2002, §3); Enoch (2006, §5). Turri (2010) carries out a positive analogue of this: he articulates with 
great precision how a certain class of views arguably avoids the Gettier problem. 
17 Williamson (2000, ch. 4); Bailey (2010). 
18 Williamson (2000, ch. 11); Shah (2003); Kolodny (2005); Schaffer (2009, pp. 366-373) and (2016); Evans (2013); 
Moss (2013). 
19 Balog (1999); Levine (2010); Greco (2012, §2, especially p. 350). 
20 Fine (1994); Johnston (2004); Schwitzgebel (2008). 
21 Chalmers and Jackson (2001); Moss (2013); Sinhababu (2015). 
22 Lewis (1979); Sinhababu (2015). 
23 Moss (2013, §5.5). 
24 Lormand (1996, pp. 52-53 and 61). 
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important. Your efforts here will be reinforced by attention to ambition, authority, and 
systematicity. Conclude by recasting your solution in a way that the reader is only now, having 
read the entire paper, in a position to fully appreciate.25 
Inversely, prune whatever is not in service of what matters. Introductory remarks, 
assumptions, definitions, resolutions of local debates, discussions of fine details, formal/technical 
language – do not hesitate to include any of these if your argument requires them. Ruthlessly 
excise them otherwise. This is, in effect, a matter of economy (see below). 
If you cannot find anything of significance in your idea for an article, scrap it and write 
something else. 
 
Economy. I am told that rocket scientists supply a spacecraft with the exact amount of 
fuel it requires to reach its destination. Perhaps this is a myth. But you should construct your 
arguments in the same spirit of economy. In particular, adjust your premises and conclusion until 
they precisely match. 
 Working from one end, find the strongest conclusion supported by your premises (or the 
broadest class of views targeted by your objection, or …). A well-constructed argument will not 
target only some very specific view of a prominent philosopher. It will target a substantial class 
of views, and it is your job to delineate that class. Also consider whether the argument can target 
a much larger class of views with only slightly stronger premises.26 
 Working from the other end, find the weakest premises which support your conclusion. 
Whenever possible, replace controversial premises with less controversial ones. Also consider 
whether the premises can be weakened substantially while weakening the conclusion of the 
argument only slightly.27 
 Continue this process of adjustment until your argument is perfectly tuned.  
 
Precision. A precise claim is specific and expresses the writer’s intended idea. A claim 
may therefore be imprecise in two ways: it may be vague rather than specific, or it may fail to 
express the writer’s intended idea irrespective of its specificity.28 Avoid imprecision in either 
form.29 
Metaphorical language, though often a great help in other respects, can also disguise 
imprecision, so be sure that you can rephrase your metaphorical claims in literal terms. Formal 
tools can in contrast help you be very precise, but be careful not to use them to make claims that 
are needlessly specific. Though it is not ideal, it is acceptable to formulate a claim roughly as long 
as you explicitly state that you are doing so and the imprecision is irrelevant for your argument. 
 
Focus. An article ought to have very few central argumentative tasks – sometimes just 
one. Delineate your task(s) precisely: by the end of your introduction, articulate your conclusion 
in detail as well as all of your assumptions; also sketch your central argumentative moves. Then 
strip away all material not required to accomplish your argumentative task(s).30 
 
                                                 
25 Fine (1994); Lewis (1979); Lormand (1996) and (ms); Schaffer (2009) and (2016); Berker (2013); Evans (2013); 
Lord (forthcoming). 
26 Berker (2013) leverages a single core idea against a very broad class of theories. 
27 Neta (2002), Sinhababu (2009), and Lormand (ms, §4) do much work with sparse resources. 
28 Obviously, a claim may also be imprecise in both ways at once. 
29 Lormand (1996) and (ms); Williamson (2000, ch.4); Bailey (2010); Schaffer (2016).  
30 Bailey (2010); Turri (2011); Sinhababu (2015). 
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 Cohesiveness. This virtue does not attach to a single view but to a system of views – a 
theory. A cohesive theory consists of mutually supporting views, views whose collective 
explanatory power is much greater than the sum of their individual explanatory powers.31 
 Focus and cohesiveness tend to compete, since one typically achieves the former by 
sparsity of posits and the latter by richness of posits. Which virtue to prefer can then be a hard 
call; see the earlier discussion of economy. 
 
Mastery of the literature. The literature on a topic usually comprises a few seminal 
texts, whether historical and contemporary, and a flood of subsequent texts. Have a deep 
knowledge of all seminal texts, as well as of those subsequent texts that you regard as excellent. 
Have at least a working acquaintance with almost everything else, especially those texts published in 
the past 5-10 years, as well as forthcoming texts. Keep up with work defending every major position 
on the topic, even those towards which you are least sympathetic. 
At an intellectual level, display your mastery of the literature by using your knowledge 
to draw a new and illuminating map of the terrain. Characterize the problems and define all terms 
in the way you regard as most perspicuous, and locate your position within a taxonomy, of your 
own devising, of all possible positions. In other words, use your knowledge of the literature to be 
authoritative and systematic, as discussed above.32 
At a more practical level, display your mastery of the literature through excellence in 
citations. Include an early footnote citing all parties to the central debate of the paper. This 
footnote should first cite the seminal literature, flagging it as such, and should then cite the rest 
of the relevant literature, relating it as appropriate to the seminal literature.33 Take special care 
to cite every author who might reasonably be asked to referee your paper. I repeat, however: 
absent some very special reason, do not cite contemporary philosophers in the body of your article. 
Relegate all such citations to the footnotes. 
 
Clarity. At every point in your article, your reader should know what has happened, what 
will happen, and what is currently happening. Accordingly, the ideal article is liberally marked 
with signposts. Some helpful signposting devices include: providing an overview of the article in 
the introduction; clearly stating your aim and your assumptions; using informative names, rather 
than numbers or unmemorable abbreviations, for central theses; using informative titles for 
sections; periodically recapitulating central results; and, most importantly, making generous use 
of transition words like thus, since, because, however, but, therefore, nevertheless, despite, further, and 
consequently.34 
Beware of sounding formulaic, however. For example, do not begin every section by 
stating, “In this section, I will show that ….” Excellent signposting is not so heavy-handed and 
involves artful variation. 
 
Concreteness. It is not in our nature to think solely via abstract principles. We find it 
hard to grasp the principle that for virtually any empirical belief that apparently amounts to 
knowledge, there is some scenario S such that S is compatible with all of the subject’s evidence 
but incompatible with the truth of that belief. We find it easy to grasp the claim that given all of 
our evidence, we might be the epistemic playthings of a deceiving demon.  So make frequent use 
                                                 
31 Williamson (2000); Neta (2002); Skorupski (2010); Graham (2012); Moss (2013); Schaffer (2016); Lord 
(forthcoming). 
32 Lormand (1996) and (ms); Neta (2002, p. 664); Turri (2010). 
33 Schellenberg (2014). 
34 Lewis (1979); Schaffer (2009), (2012), and (2016). 
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of concrete examples to supplement, though of course not to replace, abstract thought. Well-
chosen examples will clarify principles, make definitions easily digestible, and illustrate 
structural points.35 
 
Flair. Be alert to opportunities for the wry remark, the keen observation, the striking 
metaphor.36 And make each example memorable, perhaps with humor, allusion, or picturesque 
description. To rely on stock examples is a waste. 
Do not, however, use flair at the expense of clarity or precision. Use metaphorical 
language as a supplement to literal language, not as a substitute for it. And be sparing. As with 
cooking spice, flair is pleasing in moderation and noxious in excess. 
 
Originality. Originality, though it is of great importance for excellent writing, requires 




4. Writing: process 
 
The production of a body of excellent writing, like the building of a great city, requires time, and 
vast quantities of it. It is not enough to put in the occasional marathon session. Good ideas must 
simmer in the subconscious over many nights, and sometimes many months, before they mature 
to excellence. I therefore recommend that you dedicate a regular block of time to writing. 
I reserve at least one hour for writing per weekday during the teaching term and two 
hours per weekday otherwise. Though I may or may not write for longer, as time permits, I treat 
that reserved time as sacred. I do not let it be squeezed out by other professional obligations – 
not by teaching, not by grading, not even by reading and thinking. I make an effort to preserve 
my writing time even when attending conferences, though I let it go during periods of illness, 
vacation, or emergency. To ensure that other commitments lapse before this one, I schedule my 
writing for my very first block of open time each day, usually from 10-11 AM. 
Mistakes are a necessary and even fruitful part of my writing process, and keeping to this 
regimen gives me plenty of time to err. I have never expressed any significant idea correctly on 
my first try, and usually not on my second or third, either. I find that writing is like picking my 
way through a labyrinth: I always make many wrong turns, and even the right turn often leads 
me away from the exit. So I reward myself not for the number of polished pages that I write but 
for the amount of time that I spend. 
Because my mistakes are often radical, my willingness to revise is radical, too. Without 
exception, all of my best papers have been completely overhauled at least once and sometimes 
twice. I will mention a recent case about which I have kept exact records. I spent 80 hours writing 
the first draft of the paper; after receiving an invitation to revise and resubmit, I spent an 
additional 100 hours scrapping and then replacing the basic framework of the paper; and upon 
receiving a rejection letter with further comments, I spent 80 hours more revising crucial sections 
before sending out the paper once more. It is only because I treat my daily writing time as sacred 
that I can afford the luxury of proper revisions. 
That is my way through the labyrinth; you will have to find your own. 
                                                 
35 Lewis (1979); Gendler (2002, p. 47) and (2008); Sinhababu (2015). 
36 Schaffer (2009, p. 355), (2016, pp. 92-93), and (forthcoming, penultimate paragraph of §3.1); Schwitzgebel (2012, 
pp. 39-40); Williamson (1995, first sentence).  
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5. Writing: publication strategies 
 
A professional philosopher’s body of work is standardly judged along two dimensions, quantity 
and quality, which correspond to two extreme strategies for publishing. To take the extreme 
quantity strategy is to submit an article as soon as you believe it to meet the minimum quality 
standards of a solid journal, the idea being to produce an enormous quantity of solid work. To 
take the extreme quality strategy is to submit an article only once you believe it to be of the 
highest quality that you can achieve. 
Few go to such extremes. But there are very successful professionals near each of them, 
and you will find it helpful to consider roughly what point between these poles you wish to 
occupy. I prefer to be near the extreme quality pole, and my instructions in this guide have been 
formulated with that end in clear sight; those with different strategies will need to modify much 
of my advice. I am not, however, endorsing any judgments about the philosophical value of quality 
relative to quantity. I simply enjoy myself most when I attempt to write articles of the highest 
quality that I can achieve, so that is what I try to do and what I have the experience to discuss. 
There may seem to be a third extreme strategy, the strategy of producing work that is 
extreme in quantity and quality alike. In fact, this strategy is a version of the extreme quality 
strategy – philosophers who follow it just spend an astonishing amount of time on writing and 
therefore produce in great quantities. Such philosophers usually rank among the most respected 
in the profession, but do not underestimate their labor. 
You may as well take measures to increase quantity with no sacrifice in quality. For 
example, it requires a great deal of time to read and think deeply on any topic. So maximize your 
investment: write a series of papers on a single topic rather than flitting from one to the next. 
Better yet, have a project: a philosophical idea large enough that many articles are required for 
its proper development. Working on a project will, as a happy byproduct, improve your thinking 
as you settle into it. In addition, when writing articles, whether or not these are part of a project, 
limit each to a single sharply demarcated topic, as per the earlier discussions of focus and 
economy. Similarly, see a single paper to completion rather than working on several at once. In 
this way you will submit articles for review much more rapidly. 
Speaking of which: know that it is a long road between putting finger to keyboard and 
having your article accepted. Though I lack precise general data, I can at least share my own 
statistics. (I welcome information from others willing to share.) Across my 8 publications, 
between my first submitting an article and its being accepted there has been a median gap of 15 
months and a mean gap of 16.5 months. I estimate also that the gap between the moment that I 
begin a new article and the moment that I first submit it is an additional 4-8 months. In total, 
then, it typically takes about 19-23 months from when I start an article to when it is accepted. 
That’s a long time! 
Hence, you must take joy in the process of writing itself rather than in the distant prospect 
of publication, and for the sake of your career you must also start writing well in advance of 
milestones. You should have at least one publication, preferably more, before you go on the job 
market, and you will probably send out job applications almost a full academic year before you 
defend your dissertation – so you should begin work on your first article when you start your 
dissertation, if not earlier. (These two activities should be largely co-extensive.) Submit that 
article for review within the year. Also, remember that you may need to submit your tenure file 
at the start of an academic year, and that by this point you must have a substantial body of work. 
So you have no time to spare: continue to submit parts of your dissertation for review as you 
complete them. Once your dissertation is complete allow yourself a month to celebrate; then start 
new work immediately. 
 11 
 
If you have an abundance of talent, luck, and connections, then your articles will never be 
rejected, and you may skip to the last two paragraphs of this section. I, on the other hand, have 
amassed rejections by the truckload, and I have two pieces of advice on how to handle them. The 
first is psychological: maintain your confidence! Even if you receive one rejection after another, 
with no end in sight, treat these as signs of inadequate proficiency and not as signs of inadequate 
intellect. Easier said than done, I know. I have mentioned that my career began with a streak of 
18 consecutive rejections, and by the end of it my confidence was below sea-level. Now that I 
have made it to the other side, however, I can assure you that the main requirement for success 
in publishing is just toil – reflective, disciplined toil. Knowing how to write a publishable article 
is a skill. It is a skill that you will learn if you put in consistent effort and reflection. 
My second piece of advice is to take the content of referee comments very seriously, while 
ignoring the tone. Referees are often sarcastic, cruel, and dismissive, but at the same time their 
comments can almost always help you revise. In fact, though long, critical referee reports are 
invariably painful to receive, these have been my single most helpful source of comments. I have of 
course received terrific comments from advisors, mentors, friends, correspondents, and audiences 
at talks. But good referees are experts on the topic and have scrutinized the paper with unusual 
care. Many referees have given me 4 pages or more of thoughtful and sharply critical feedback. 
Only from a handful of others have I gotten anything comparable. Thus, when I receive negative 
comments from a referee, I do not attempt to revise immediately. I always feel upset when I first 
read such comments, and I must set them aside for a day or two so that I can return to them with 
a level head. Then I consider the comments one at a time, taking each seriously. 
Taking a comment seriously is compatible with making no revisions in response, but it is 
only rarely that I find myself so unmoved. Even when I think that a referee has simply missed 
the point – and I think this often – I almost always find that I can clarify my idea so that it will 
not be missed again. On occasion, however, a comment is just misguided and is best ignored. Let 
your calm, considered judgment be your guide. 
Indeed, before I submit an article for review, I find it helpful to examine my work from 
the perspective of two kinds of referees. I first ask what my article does best according to my most 
sympathetic referee. Taking this perspective tells me what to showcase and what to strip away. I 
then ask what my article does worst according to my least sympathetic referee. Taking this 
perspective reminds me to address important objections, add key qualifications, head off potential 
misunderstandings, and most of all define my dialectical task precisely. To put things another 
way, when a work has certain virtues, an attentive referee will want to accept it, and when a work 
has certain vices, an attentive referee will want to reject it, so it is wise to write both so as to 
invite acceptance and so as to avoid rejection. 
By the way, please never let yourself become a sarcastic, cruel, or dismissive referee. A 
referee is right to have high standards, but it is one thing to state precisely and in detail why an 
article is not publishable and another to make its author an object of scorn. Indeed, I believe that 
it is the responsibility of a referee also to note what an article does well, even when that article falls 
far short of being publishable. Such observations, besides being a kindness to the author, help her 





6. Cultivating yourself as a philosopher 
 
This writing guide began with an autobiography, and it is time to finish the tale. After my 
miserable first outings in the world of publishing came the realization that I lacked crucial 
writing skills. I resolved to learn all that I could. I began by requesting all the feedback that I 
could get on my own work.  
But I met an obstacle: I was no good at putting the information I gathered to any general 
use. I would learn that I needed to include certain citations on p. 29 or that I should assume 
rather than arguing for the transparency of experience, and I understood how to apply these 
pieces of advice in the immediate context. But because I did not grasp the general principles 
underlying the particular advice, I continued to make the mistakes of just the same type.  
It was here that my lack of talent was made manifest, for talent – I conjecture – consists 
largely in the ability to pick up principles of expertise from mere hints and examples. Like a 
talented dancer who sees a dramatic performance of the tango and just knows how to dance like 
that, a talented philosopher sees the ambitiousness of Plato and the systematicity of Kant and just 
knows how to write like that. The talented person moves smoothly from seeing examples of 
expertise to internalizing the underlying principles without ever needing to (and usually without 
being able to) articulate them. The rest of us need to be told to lengthen our strides, square our 
hips, lift our chins. 
Lacking the benefits of talent, I had to practice reformulating any advice that I received 
into specific but general principles. (Note that I do not use the italicized terms as contraries; the 
specific is to be contrasted with the vague, the general with the particular.) When told that I 
needed to include a certain citation, I attempted to articulate the specific general condition that 
warranted that citation. When told that I should assume rather than defending the transparency 
of experience, I attempted to articulate the specific general condition under which I should 
assume rather than defending a claim. And so on. 
Still with the aim of articulating specific yet general principles, I also began to seek 
exemplars of excellent philosophical writing. I followed the work of several contemporary 
philosophers who were consistently publishing in top-tier journals. So that I might learn from a 
wealth of data, I would read a series of papers by one philosopher before moving to the next. 
Once I gained some confidence in my ability to discern excellence, I expanded my search to 
include any outstanding work, whether in the form of a contemporary article or a historical book. 
All the while I asked successful philosophers to tell me, with as much precision as possible, what 
works they regarded as best and why, what they saw as the best features of their own work, and, 
ascending a level, what their processes of writing, reading, and thinking were like. 
I recorded the principles that I posited in a Word document intended for personal use. 
That document eventually expanded into this writing guide.  
In these attempts to improve my writing, I was engaging in reflection at three levels. I 
was reflecting, first, on what makes for excellent philosophical work, second, on what makes for 
an excellent process of producing philosophical work, and third, on how a person can, without 
relying on talent, identify and learn those processes. I think of these levels as corresponding to 
certain goods, rules, and virtues distinctive to philosophy. My most basic advice on self-
cultivation, then, is to carry out your own reflections, which will mutually inform one another, 
across all three levels. 
A practical method for doing so is to design your own guide to philosophical writing. (If you 
have internalized my previous advice about ambition and authority, then you must surely doubt 
much of what you find here!) Start small: whenever you read a great philosophical article or book, 
whether it is contemporary or historical, identify and write down its virtues in specific but 
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general terms. And there’s no need to go it alone; learn from others. When I meet philosophers 
at conferences, I like to ask which contemporary and historical works they most admire and why, 
and especially which works they most admire while adamantly disagreeing with. Many times 
such conversations have helped me recognize virtues that I had previously appreciated only 
implicitly, if at all. Even if you reserve your guide for personal use, just articulating your 
understanding of philosophical excellence as precisely as you can will give you much more 
control over your writing.  
Cultivate yourself not only as a writer, but also as a thinker. Read broadly as well as 
deeply, taking time to appreciate great historical works. And be fearless about developing new 
skills at every stage of your career. It is never too late to acquaint yourself with Sanskrit, modal 
logic, or vision science.  
Make sure to have a life beyond the profession, too. For us, philosophy is a part of the 
good life, but only a part. A reader of this guide might be left with the impression that philosophy 
is my consuming passion, one that leaves no time to spare. That is not true. I rarely put in more 
than 50 hours per week of research, teaching, and service, and I make it my personal ideal to have 
satisfying personal relationships, keep up one or two serious hobbies, eat well, exercise regularly, 
meditate daily, and sleep plenty. 
 Do I reach this ideal? Never! – but I come close enough (and that is not particularly close) 
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